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NOTES
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti:1 Can New
York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment
Challenge?
The enormous box office success of recent films such as The
Godfather Part III,2 GoodFellas,' and The Silence of the Lambs,4 il-
lustrates the public's fascination with criminals and their atrocities.
Criminals willing to tell the stories of their exploits satisfy the
public's curiosity and reap great financial reward in the process.5
Outraged that criminals profit while their victims are left uncom-
pensated, approximately forty state legislatures6 and the federal
1 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 59
U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1991) (No. 90-1059).
2 The Godfather Part III (Paramount Pictures 1990).
3 GoodFellas (Warner Bros. 1990).
4 The Silence of the Lambs (Orion 1991).
5 For example, David Berkowitz, the "Son of Sam" who terrorized New York city
in the summer of 1977, received $75,000 from McGraw Hill for the rights to his story.
Court to Rule on Son of Sam's Book, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1979, at A22, col. 1. Henry Hill,
the low-level career criminal portrayed in the novel by N. PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A
MAFIA FAMILY (1986) and the film GoodFelas (Warner Bros. 1990) earned over $100,000
plus future royalties by selling his story to Simon & Schuster, Inc. Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 780. In addition, the lawyer for Robert E. Chambers, Jr.,
who murdered Jennifer Dawn Levin in New York's Central Park in 1986, received over
one hundred offers for movies or television films within one month of the murder.
Yardley, Mass Media Murder Mania, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1986, at C2, col. 1.
6 ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1982 & Supp. 1990); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-90-308 (1987); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-06 (1987 & Supp.
1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 044.512 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (1982);
HAW. REV. STAT. §351-81 to -88 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 70, para. 403 (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE § 16-7-3.7-2 to -6 (1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 (Supp. 1990);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §46:1831 to 1839
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West
Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045 (Vernon Supp. 1991), MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(1)(d) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836 to -1840 (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.265 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (1990); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney
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government 7 have passed laws that redirect these profits.
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a first amendment
constitutional challenge to New York's criminal anti-profit statute,
commonly referred to as the "Son of Sam law."' New York Exec-
utive Law section 632-a requires that the money criminals derive
from the reenactment of their crimes be deposited in an escrow
account to assure the payment of any civil judgments the victims
recover against the criminals. Simon & Schuster, a publishing
company, claims the law unconstitutionally abridges the freedom
of speech, essentially because criminals will be less willing to tell
their stories without immediate compensation. While the court
upheld the statute against the first amendment claims of the crim-
inal and the publisher, its first amendment analysis is flawed.
First, the court declared that the statute directly restricted speech,
requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling state interest.
Second, the court found the law able to withstand this strict level
of scrutiny. If the Supreme Court agrees with the Second Circuit
that the burden is direct and strict scrutiny is the appropriate
level of review, the Court will probably find the law unconstitu-
tional.9
This Comment reviews the Second Circuit's decision and
suggests a different result. Part I describes New York's Son of
Sam legislation that is at issue. Part II presents the relevant facts
1982 & Supp. 1991); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2969.01-.06 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 17 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
180-7.18 (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-25.1-3 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-28A-1 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-13-202 (1980 & Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §
16 (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.68200 (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 1-
40-112(d) (1988).
7 Special Forfeiture of Collateral Profits of Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-82 (1988).
8 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The formal title of the
statute is "Distribution of Moneys Received as a Result of the Commission of Crime."
The New York Superior Court considered and rejected a first amendment challenge to
the Son of Sam law in Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 541
N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1989). Previous New York cases never reached the first amend-
ment issue. See Heath v. Warner Communications, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
29, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); In re Johnsen, 103 Misc. 2d 823, 430
N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350
(Sup. Ct. 1979).
9 The Court rarely upholds a statute subject to strict scrutiny. In Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414 (1988), the Court applied strict scrutiny and stated that the government's
burden to justify a law .subject to this standard "is well-nigh insurmountable." Id. at 425.
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and holdings in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti. Part III reviews
the various levels of scrutiny the Court employs to determine the
constitutionality of a statute that interferes with freedom of ex-
pression. This Part attempts to clarify when the balancing test of
United States v. O'Brien1" is appropriate by focusing on the re-
quirements or prerequisites that a statute must meet before the
O'Brien test can be employed. Part IV analyzes the Second
Circuit's decision and its approach to determining the appropriate
level of scrutiny. This Comment suggests that the Second Circuit's
reasoning and holding in Simon & Schuster is flawed. Finally, Part
IV proposes the proper first amendment analysis of the statute by
considering the first amendment rights of free expression, free
press and the rights to acquire and receive information. Part V
concludes that the Supreme Court should find the statute creates,
at most, only an incidental burden on freedom of expression, and
as such should uphold the statute.
I. NEW YORK's SON OF SAM LAW
In the summer of 1977, David Berkowitz, known as the "Son
of Sam," terrorized New York City's residents with his random
shootings of young women and their escorts." Outraged that the
media would offer this forty-four caliber killer large sums of mon-
ey for his story, the New York legislature enacted a law to redi-
rect criminals' proceeds to compensate their victims.1 2 New York
Executive Law section 632-a provides that any legal entity con
tracting with 'any person accused or convicted of a crime" in
10 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
11 N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1977, at Al, col. 6.
12 The memorandum of the bill's sponsor, Senator Emanuel R. Gold, stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as
the forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money for his
story once he is captured-while five people are dead, other people were injured
as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal
situations, the victim must be more important than the criminal.
1977 New York State Legislative Annual 267.
The New York law, N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991), as
well as similar laws of other states have appropriately been dubbed Son of Sam laws
after the killer. Ironically, the law was never actually applied to David Berkowitz, the Son
of Sam murderer who police captured shortly after the legislature passed the law.
Berkowitz was declared incompetent to stand trial, and at that time the law covered only
convicted criminals. Hevesi, Cases Under 'Sam' Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 1991, at B8, col. 4.
13 A person convicted of a crime includes "any person who has voluntarily and in-
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New York, for the production of books, movies, magazine articles
and the like in which his or her crime is reenacted or in which
the "person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions" about the
crime are expressed, must submit a copy of such contracts to the
New York State Grime Victims Board. If the Board determines
that this statute applies to the contract, the entity must turn over
all money owed to the accused or convicted person as a result of
the contract to the Board.14 The statute directs that the Board
deposit the money in an escrow account for the benefit of, and
payable to, any victim of crimes that the convicted or accused
person committed, but only if the accused person is eventually
convicted of the crime.15 To gain access to these funds, the vic-
tim must recover a money judgment in a civil action brought
against the criminal within five years of the establishment of the
escrow account.
16
The Board satisfies claims against the money in the escrow
account in the order described below. Attorney's fees granted by
a court of competent jurisdiction for the representation of the
accused person at any stage of the criminal proceedings, including
appeal, and expenses the Board grants for the production of the
money paid into the escrow account have first priority. The total
telligently admitted the commission of a crime for which the person is not prosecuted.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The statute also includes
the representative or assignee of any such person. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(i) (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1991).
14 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The statute provides:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity
contracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, ac-
cused or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of
such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phono-
graph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or
from the expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings,
opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such con-
tract to the board and pay over to the board any moneys which would other-
wise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so accused or convict-
ed or his representatives. The board shall deposit such moneys in an escrow
account for the benefit of and payable to any victim or the legal representative
of any victim of crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by such
accused person, but only if such accused person is eventually convicted of the
crime and provided that such victim, within five years of the date of the estab-
lishment of such escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of competent
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of these fees and expenses may not exceed one-fifth of the ac-
count. Next, the Board satisfies subrogation claims of the state for
payments made to the victim. This amount may not exceed one-
half of the net amount the victim obtains in a civil judgment. The
next priority goes to the civil judgments of the victims of the
crime. Finally, the Board fulfills judgments of other creditors and
persons presenting lawful demands, including tax authorities.
7
Upon a showing by any convicted person that five years have
elapsed from the establishment of the escrow account, and that
no actions are pending against the convicted person, the board
must return any money left in the escrow account to the convict-
ed person.'
The application of New York's anti-profit law to a contract
between Simon & Schuster and Henry Hill has provided the Su-
preme Court with an opportunity to review the constitutionality
of these statutes.
II. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. V. FRscHErrI
In April 1980, police arrested and charged Henry Hill with
six counts of conspiracy to sell drugs." Hill, described as a ca-
reer criminal and organized crime "foot-soldier," 29 agreed to co-
operate with federal and state law enforcement agencies, who in
turn granted him immunity from prosecution and entered him
into the Federal Witness Protection Program.
After learning that Hill authorized his attorney to sell his
story for publication, the editor-in-chief at Simon & Schuster con-
ceived an idea to create a nonfiction work to dispel the common-
ly-held romantic notions about life in a crime "family" by provid-
ing an accurate picture of the everyday life of a low-level member
of a criminal enterprise.21 Sterling Lord, a prominent literary
agent, commissioned' Nicholas Pileggi, an experienced crime writ-
er, to write the book. Lord ultimately negotiated a book contract
among Hill, Pileggi and Simon & Schuster.22 The result of the
17 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a(1i)(a)-(e) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
18 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(4) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
19 Brief for Appellee at 16, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9192) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
20 Brief for Appellant at 7, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9192) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
21 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1990).
22 I& In the contract, Hill and Pileggi sold exclusive publishing rights to Simon &
Schuster. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 16. An early agreement made between
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collaboration between Pileggi and Hill was a popular and widely
acclaimed book, published by Simon & Schuster in January 1986,
entitled Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family.2" In 1990, Martin
Scorcese created the movie GoodFellas"4 from Pileggi's novel.
On January 31, 1986, citing New York Executive Law section
632-a,25 counsel for the New York State Crime Victims Board
directed Simon & Schuster to provide to the Board copies of all
contracts between Hill and the publisher, and to suspend pay-
ments to Sterling Lord for Hill's account.26 The Victims Board
determined that the contract was of the type regulated by New
York Executive Law section 632-a,27 and ordered that all pay-
ments and future royalties to Hill or Hill's representatives be
turned over to the Board to be held in escrow for the victims of
the crimes Henry Hill committed.2
Simon & Schuster brought an action against the members of
the New York State Crime Victims Board seeking an order declar-
ing that New York's Son of Sam law violated the first and four-
teenth amendments. 9 The district court found no first amend-
Hill, Pileggi and Lord provided for the division of payments to be received from Simon
& Schuster. Id.
23 N. PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1986). The book describes in
detail the crimes in which Henry Hill participated during his criminal career: bribery,
assault, extortion, theft, burglary, arson, drug dealing, credit card fraud and murder.
Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779. Among the more celebrated crimes in which Henry
Hill was involved include the six million dollar theft from the Lufthansa terminal at
Kennedy airport and the bribery of Boston College basketball players. Id. G. Robert
Blakey, O'Neill Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame, praised Wiseguy for
deglamorizing organized crime. N.Y.LJ., Apr. 15, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
24 GoodFellas (Warner Bros. 1990).
25 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
26 Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 780. Simon & Schuster provided the contract to
the Victim's Board and revealed that the publisher made payments totaling $96,250 to
the Sterling Lord Agency for Henry Hill's account. 1d.
27 The Board found that Wiseguy contains Hill's "thoughts, feelings, opinions and
emotions regarding crimes [he] committed . . . as well as his admissions to involvement
in such crimes." Id.
28 Id. In the Board's Final Determination and Order, the Board ordered Hill to pay
over all money received, plus interest, less commissions paid to Sterling Lord. The
Board ordered Simon & Schuster to transfer to the Board all payments due Hill, includ-
ing the $27,958 presently held, as well as all future royalties. In addition, if Hill failed
to turn over the money to the Board, Simon & Schuster was responsible to turn over
the money wrongfully distributed to Hill. The Board determined that no payments made
to Nicholas Pileggi, the author, were subject to section 632-a. Id. The Board permitted
the agent, Sterling Lord, to retain its ten percent literary fee as provided for in the
contract pursuant to New York Executive Law section 632-a(8). Brief for Appellee, supra
note 19, at 19.
29 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F.
[Vol, 66:1075
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ment violation explaining that the Son of Sam law did not direct-
ly affect expressive activity. Instead, the court held that the statute
was directed at regulating proceeds of the contract, a nonspeech
activity. ° As such, the court was satisfied that the incidental re-
striction on first amendment freedom was no greater than essen-
tial to achieve the state's important interest in compensating
crime victims."1  The district court also rejected Simon &
Schuster's fourteenth amendment claim that the statute is
overbroad and vague.
3 2
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the statute imposed
a direct burden on free expression and created a content-based
restriction on speech subject to review under a strict scrutiny
standard."3 The court nonetheless upheld the statute, explaining
that the statute was narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's
compelling interest of "denying criminals any gain from the sto-
ries of their crimes until the victims of those crimes. are fully
compensated for all losses arising out of their victimization."
34
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine whether
this kind of law directly burdens the first amendment's guarantee
of free expression, thus requiring strict scrutiny, and if so, wheth-
er the statute can survive this type of scrutiny.-
5
Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
30 Id. at 178.
31 Id at 179.
32 1d. at 180. Simon & Schuster did not advance the overbreadth and vagueness
claims on appeal. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1990).
For a discussion on the vagueness of Son of Sam laws, see Comment, Criminal Antiprofit
Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76 CALIF. L REv. 1353, 1370-71
(1988) [hereinafter Criminal Antiprofit Laws]; Comment, The Expansion of Victim Compensa-
tion Programs: Today's "Son of Sam" Legislation and its Susceptibility to Constitutional Chal-
lenge, 18 U. TOL. L. REv. 155, 175-78 (1986) [hereinafter Victim Compensation Programs].
The Son of Sam laws also raise a procedural due process question. See Children of Bed-
ford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 1002-04, 541 N.Y.S.2d 894, 894-97 (Sup. Ct.
1989); Case Note, Crime Doesn't Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit From a Criminal's
Stoy: Fasching v. Kallinger, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 831, 848-50 (1987) [hereinafter Crime Does-
n't Pay]; Note, In Cold Type: Statutoy Approaches to the Problem of the Offender as Author,
71 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 271-73 (1980) [hereinafter, Cold Type]; Comment,
Victim Compensation Programs, supra, at 178-80.
33 Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 781-82.
34 Id. at 783.
35 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 59
U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb 19, 1991) (No. 90-1059).
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III. EVALUATING FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'5 The
language of the first amendment "appears to speak in absolutist
terms." 7 Nonetheless, the majority of the Court has never ex-
plicitly adopted an absolutist view of free speech."8 Rather, the
Court determines "the strength of the first amendment rights in
relation to the other individual rights." 9
The Supreme Court has adopted different standards of judi-
cial review for various types of free speech problems. The variety
of values underlying the first amendment makes the use of a
single standard implausible." These values include preventing
human error through ignorance, encouraging public enlighten-
ment, creating an open marketplace to determine truth, allowing
for individual self-fulfillment, maintaining a check on the govern-
ment, and providing a safety valve for the resentful to vent their
hostilities.41 The Court has also recognized that speech can be
chilled by direct regulation,4" indirectly,4" or incidentally.44 All
of these considerations have prompted the Court to develop dif-
ferent standards to review the constitutionality of governmental
actions that burden speech.
36 The first amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievaAces." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SuB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.7, at 19 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA].
38 Id. at 20.
39 Id.
40 Id. § 20.6, at 14.
41 Id. at 14-16. For further study of the values underlying the first amendment see
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-15 (1966); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948); F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1982); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L REV. 1 (1965).
42 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (a statute forbidding
peaceful picketing regarding certain topics is a direct burden on speech).
43 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983) (a special tax on the press indirectly regulates speech).
44 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (a statute prohibiting the burning
of draft cards is an incidental burden on speech).
[Vol. 66:1075
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A. Standards of Review
In most cases, establishing whether a burden on free expres-
sion is the result of direct, deliberate suppression of the speech,
or is incidental to a regulation, determines the proper standard of
review." This distinction is crucial because as Simon & Schuster
45 The exception to this general rule is when the speech at issue in not fully pro-
tected. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are cer-
tain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problems. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words." (footnote omitted)); but see
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Court noted:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor poli-
cy to give any more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere
labels' of state law. Uke insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts,
breach of peace, obscenity, solicitation for legal business, and the various other
formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this
- Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
Id. at 269 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Current law indicates that the first amendment does not protect four classes of
speech: Advocacy of illegal conduct, fighting words, obscenity, and child pornography.
For a discussion on advocacy of illegal conduct, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969) (speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action [that] is
likely to incite or produce such action" is unprotected speech.) For a discussion of the
"fighting words" exception, see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942) (defining "fighting
words" as words that "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace"); see also Gard, Fighting Words As Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 531 (1980);
Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1974); Comment, The Fighting Words Doctrine - Is There A Clear and Pres-
ent Danger to the Standard?, 84 DICK. L. REV. 75 (1979). For a discussion of the obscenity
exception, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining obscenity as material,
taken as a whole, that the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find appeals to the prurient interest in sex; depicts in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the state law; and lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value). For a discussion on the child pornography exception see
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) ("classifying child pornography as a cate-
gory of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with
our earlier discussions."). But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at
930 (1988) (classifying child pornography as less protected speech).
Furthermore, some speech that is protected does not receive full first amendment
protection. Rather, the Court has created classes of speech that are given less protection.
The new categories of less protected speech include' "commercial speech, near-obscene
and offensive speech . . . defamation, and possibly the speech of public employees." Id.
See e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (ex-
cluding defamation of private figures in which no issue of public interest is involved
from first amendment protection); F.C.C. v. Pacific Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-48 (1978)
(indicating near-obscene offensive speech receives less first amendment protection); Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (commercial
10751
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
correctly points out, "[tihe determination that a law is subject to
strict scrutiny almost always presages invalidation."4 6 For a law to
survive strict scrutiny it must be necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that end.47
Supreme Court precedent suggests that state interests must
meet two criteria to receive the "compelling" label. First, the
state must have a strong interest in realizing the statute's un-
derlying policies. Second, the magnitude of the state interests
achieved must outweigh the restriction's chilling effect on
speech. Supreme Court decisions indicate that if a regulation
chills speech too much, the Court will not describe the interest
as "compelling."
4 8
The Court rarely upholds a statute under strict scrutiny.4 9
Incidental burdens and time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech" do not require exacting scrutiny so long as they are
content-neutral, not aimed at the communicative effect of the
conduct, and leave open ample alternative channels of communi-
cation.5 Instead, the Court applies the less stringent balancing
speech is entitled to first amendment protection; however, that protection is less exten-
sive than for other types of speech); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (ex-
tending Sullivan to public figures); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(extending first amendment protection to defamation of public officials unless the state-
ment was made with actual malice). But see Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to
Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1983). If the speech fits into one of these
classes, the Court will apply the special test developed for that class.
46 Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 20.
47 Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
48 Note, Criminals Selling Their Stories: The First Amendment Requires Legislative Reex-
amination, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1331, 1340 (1987). The Court is sensitive to the quan-
tum of speech chilled regardless of the type of burden. For example, for a regulation
that creates an incidental burden on speech to be valid, it must leave open ample alter-
native channels of communication. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
49 The Court has stated that the government's burden to justify a statute subject to
strict scrutiny "is well-nigh insurmountable." Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
50 In the past, the Court has distinguished time, place and manner restrictions,
which are not aimed at suppression, from other incidental burdens. Nonetheless, in re-
cent cases the Court has blended the scrutiny of time, place, and manner restrictions
into that given other incidental burdens. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) ("[T]he four-factor standard of United States v. O'Brien for vali-
dating a regulation of expressive conduct . . . is little, if any, different from the stan-
dard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.") (citation omitted). See also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1989).
51 According to the Court, incidental infringements on first amendment rights can
be justified:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
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test announced in United States v. O'Brien.52 To pass this level of
scrutiny, the burden on speech must further an important or
substantial governmental interest and the incidental restriction on
the first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is essen-
tial to further the governmental interest.53 In recent cases, the
Court has held that if the governmental interest "would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation" it meets the re-
quirement that the regulation be no greater than is essential to
further the governmental interest.
5 4
As will be illustrated, the Court's different approaches devel-
oped in first amendment case law to determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny should not be applied in a broad, categorical
fashion. Rather, when the government asserts that a regulation
burdens speech only incidentally, the appropriate standard of
review must be carefully determined in light of the Supreme
Court's recent refinements of the prerequisites of the O'Brien test.
B. The O'Brien Test55
This section attempts to clarify when O'Brien's less demanding
test is appropriately applied to incidental burdens by focusing on
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the prerequisites for this
test. Before the Court will apply O'Brien's test, the government
must demonstrate that the regulation is content-neutral, that the
government's interest is unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion, and that the regulation leaves open ample alternative chan-
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
The test for incidental burdens also includes an inquiry into whether or not the regula-
tion leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information and
whether or not the regulation is content-neutral. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 ("[fln the last
analysis [the O'Brien test] is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions.").
52 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In OBrien the Court considered a law forbidding the de-
struction of draft cards. O'Brien claimed that by burning his draft card he was express-
ing his objection to the draft and the Vietnam War. While the Court recognized that
the first amendment protects expressive conduct, it did not apply strict scrutiny because
the law was not aimed at suppressing expression, rather its purpose was to preserve the
draft system.
53 Id at 377.
54 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985); Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-800;
Clark, 468 U.S. at 297; City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 815-16 (1984).
55 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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nels for communication." These requirements are discussed inturn below.
1. Content-Neutrality
Regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on
the basis of its content presumptively violate the first amend-
ment.17 The Court has stated that "[tlhe essence of ... forbid-
den censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive
activity because of its content would completely undercut the
'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.""'5
Impermissible content-based restrictions are those that are de-
signed to restrict certain speech because of its communicative
impact. In other words, these restrictions limit the speech because
of the message it conveys. 9 Impermissible content-based restric-
tions include regulations that discriminate on the basis of the
speaker's viewpoint.6" The critical inquiry to determine if the
regulation is content-based is whether it is justified by referring to
the content of the speech.6" The Court applies the "most exact-
56 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57 See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-99 (1972).
58 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)).
59 Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189,
190 (1983).
60 The Court has stated that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest
form." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983). In
Perry, the Board of Education granted one teacher's union access to a school mail sys-
tem but refused to allow a rival union similar access. The Court found that the policy
was not motivated by the desire to suppress the views of rival unions and concluded
that the policy did not constitute viewpoint discrimination barred by the first amend-
ment. Id. at 49. See also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540 (1983) (upholding a federal statute denying taxpayers a tax-deduction for contribu-
tions to otherwise tax exempt organizations-other than tax exempt veterans' organiza-
tions-if a substantial part of the organization's activities consists'of attempts to influence
legislation). In this case, the Court treated the speaker-based distinction as an equal pro-
tection issue, stating that "statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation
to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 547. The Court emphasized that "[t]he case
would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a
way as to '[aim] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'" Id. at 548, (quoting
Cammerano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
61 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 ("Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone."). For
examples of regulations justified on the basis of the content of the speech, see Consoli-
dated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (holding that a New York
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ing scrutiny"6" to content-based regulations," and almost invari-
ably finds that content-based regulations are unconstitutional. 4
The Court defines content-neutral speech regulations as those
that are 'Justified without reference to the content of the regulat-
ed speech." 5 Despite the Court's harsh criticism of content-
based regulations, the Court in recent cases has upheld a number
of restrictions that are related to speech content. 6 The Court
has treated some regulations that discriminate on the basis of
content as content-neutral as long as the regulation is aimed at
the secondary effects that accompany that particular kind of
speech, and is not aimed at suppressing the speech itself.67 Ac-
Public Service Commission order that restricted utilities from discussing nuclear power in
its monthly mailings was content-based); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). In
Niemotho, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses were denied a permit to use a city park for
Bible talks, although other political and religious groups had been allowed to put the
park to analogous uses. The Court concluded that the denial of a permit could only be
justified by reference to the content of the speech. Id. at 272.
62 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). See also FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 402 (1984); Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at
537-38, 544; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95, 101-02. See also Stone, supra note 59, at 196, in
which he observed that "[in assessing the constitutionality of content-based restric-
tions . . . the Court employs a standard that approaches absolute protection."
63 For a discussion of the rationale for applying the strict scrutiny standard to all
content-based restrictions, see Stone, supra note 59, at 200-33.
64 See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L REv. 46, 48 (1987).
65 Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
66 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning ordinance re-
stricting the location of only adult movie theaters does not violate the first amendment);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (regulation prohibiting deceptive use of optomet-
rical trade names does not violate the first amendment); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (restriction of indecent language does not violate the
first amendment); Obralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (regulation of
solicitation likely to involve fraud does not violate the first amendment); Young v. Amer-
ican Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (zoning ordinances of
only adult movie theaters does not violate the first amendment); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion) (prohibition of only political
advertising on a city owned bus does not violate the first amendment).
67 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49. All of the Supreme Court Justices did not agree with
the holding in Renton, though. Justices Brennan and Marshall found that a regulation
aimed at secondary effects is not necessarily content-neutral. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-38 (1988) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.,
concurring) Justice Brennan and Marshall wrote separately to register their continued
disagreement with Renton's holding that "an otherwise content-based restriction on speech
can be recast as 'content-neutral' if the restriction 'aims'. at 'secondary effects' of the
speech." See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 804 n.1 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (Renton poses a "serious threat to free expression"); L. TRIBE, supra note
45 at 798 n.17. For a discussion of Renton's effect on content classification see Note,
The Content Distinction In Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1904
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cording to the Court, "[t]he government's purpose is the control-
ling consideration.""
2. Government's Interest Is Unrelated to Suppression of
Expression
The second prerequisite of O'Brien focuses on the underlying
governmental interest.69 The government's interest must be unre-
lated to the suppression of expression under O'Brien. If the action
is aimed at suppressing expression it is a direct burden on free
speech,7" and the Court will strictly scrutinize the regulation, just
as it does content-based restrictions.
Since the government is-likely to claim that it is not aiming
to suppress speech, courts must conduct their own investigations
to discern the aim of regulations. The court considers the con-
duct regulated and the government's purpose for the regulation
to determine the aim. Conduct and its effect may be character-
ized as communicative or non-communicative. In addition, some
conduct may have both communicative and non-communicative
elements or effects."1 Any time a regulation is aimed at suppress-
ing the communicative element of the conduct, the governmental
regulation is subject to strict scrutiny.72
Regulations unrelated to suppression of expression are aimed
at some non-communicative effect of conduct instead of the com-
municative impact. For instance, the government might regulate
the time, place or manner of communicative conduct solely be-
cause of its non-communicative impact.7' Another example of
this type of regulation is when the government aims to regulate
the non-communicative aspect of conduct having both communica-
tive and non-communicative effects.74
(1989). Nonetheless, the Court has reaffirmed Renton's holding in Ward. 491 U.S. at 791.
68 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("The government's purpose is the controlling consider-
ation."). For further discussion of content-neutral restrictions, see Farber, Content Regula-
tion and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 CEO. UJ. 727 (1980); Stone, supra
note 64, at 48-54 (1987); Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton,
102 HARV. L REV. 1904 (1989).
69 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
71 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
72 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.
73 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayer for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984); Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981).
74 O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (burning a draft card has the dual effect of communicating
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3. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
The final step in the determination of whether a regulation
should be subject to O'Brien's less demanding balancing test is
whether the regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for
communication 'of the information. 75 If the regulation meets this
final test, the court should use'the mid-level O'Brien standard to
scrutinize it.
The Supreme Court's designation of the appropriate standard
of review for the Son of Sam statute will determine whether or
not the statute is constitutional. If the Court determines that the
burden is direct and applies strict scrutiny, the law will probably
fail constitutional scrutiny. On the other hand, if the Court finds
that the statute should be subject to the O'Brien level of scrutiny,
the statute has a chance of survival. 76 The next Part discusses
the appropriate standard of judicial review for the Son of Sam
Law.
IV. SON OF SAM LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Numerous commentators have speculated on whether the
various Son of Sam laws could withstand a first amendment chal-
lenge." These commentators applied numerous tests and
anti-war sentiment and disabling the ,draft system). If the conduct regulated has no com-
municative element and the regulation is not aimed at suppressing speech indirectly, the
first amendment provides no protection. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697
(1986).
75 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
76 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990). Although
the Second Circuit's discussion of the statute's ability to survive strict scrutiny is ques-
tionable, this same discussion is persuasive enough to satisfy the mid-level scrutiny of the
O'Brien test.
77 See Commentary, Alabama's Anti-Profit Statute: A Recent Trend in Victim Compensa-
tion, 33 ALA. L. REV. 109 (1981); Comment, Crime Victims Compensation Act-Article 8309-1:
Texas Compensates Victims of Crime, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 247 (1980); Note, Criminal
Antiprofit Laws, supra note 32; Snider, Coming Soon to a Theater Near You, 7 CAL. LAW.
29 (1987); Note, Compensating the Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story-The Con-
stitutionality of the New York Approach, 14 CoLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93 (1978); Note,
supra note 48; Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victims' Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND.
LJ. 443 (1979); Note, Cold Type, supra note 32; Comment, Victims' Compensation: Congress
Acts to Make Sure Crime Doesn't Pay-Sometimes, 7 Loy. ENT. UJ. 201 (Winter 1987); 1983
Calforania Legislation. Criminal Procedure; Convicted, Felons-Story Proceeds and Involuntay
Trusts, 15 PAc. L.J. 570 (1984); Case Note, Crime Doesn't Pay, supra note 32; Comment,
Victim Compensation Programs, supra note 32.
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achieved various results. 7 8 Likewise, even though the district
court and the Second Circuit both found that the statute with-
stood the first amendment challenge, they applied different rea-
soning and different tests.79 The Second Circuit's categorical ap-
proach caused the court to apply the wrong standard of review to
New York's Son of Sam law.
A. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti:° A Flawed Analysis
The Second Circuit's analysis of New York's Son of Sam law
began by determining whether the statute caused a, direct or an
incidental burden on speech, in order to establish the appropriate
standard of review. Instead of carefully considering whether the
statute met the three prerequisites of the O'Brien test,81 in light
of related recent Supreme Court cases, the court made a poor
analogy to a category of regulations the Supreme Court strictly
scrutinizes. The court's analysis is short-sighted for three reasons.
First, the court misapplied case law in order to reject the lower
court's determination that the statute was subject to the O'Brien
test for incidental burdens. Second, the court failed to apply the
correct test to determine if the regulation is content-neutral.
Third, the court upheld the statute even under strict scrutiny.
These three arguments are discussed in turn below.
1. Direct Burden On Speech
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's use of mid-
level scrutiny for incidental burdens on speech developed in Unit-
ed States v. O'Brien.2 The court relied on Texas v. Johnson81 to
find O'Brien's less stringent standard inapplicable to Simon &
Schuster. However, the Second Circuit interpreted Texas v. Johnson
so that it effectively obviated the O'Brien test.
The Second Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in Texas v.
Johnson required "that the governmental interest in question be
unconnected to expression in order to come under O'Brien's less
78 See supra note 77.
79 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990); Simon &
Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
80 Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d 777.
81 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
83 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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demanding rule."84 This quote from Johnson is preceded by a full
reiteration of the O'Brien test, which requires "the governmental
interest [be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
" 5
The Court in Johnson held that because the state's interest in the
flag burning statute was related to the suppression of expression,
the O'Brien test was inapplicable. 6 By choosing to cite the less
complete version of the Supreme Court's discussion of O'Brien in
Johnson, the Second Circuit misapplied Johnson, functionally de-
stroying O'Brien. The Second Circuit focused on the phrase "un-
connected. to expression" in the Johnson holding. It read Johnson
to mean that if there is any relationship between expression and
the government's regulation, rather than the government's inter-
est, the lesser standard of O'Brien could not be applied.
O'Brien recognized that there is an inevitable relationship
between expression and the governmental regulations, especially
when conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements.
O'Brien allows regulations that inhibit speech to be scrutinized
under its less demanding rule so long as the government's interest
is not related to suppressing speech. The Second Circuit's conclu-
sion that "[i]t cannot be said that the governmental interest ad-
vanced by section 632-a bears no relation to expression" 7 was
not predicated, on the Second Circuit's analysis of the governmen-
tal interest. Instead of focusing on the government's interest, the
Second Circuit focused on the regulation. The Second Circuit
easily found a relationship between the government's regulation
and speech. As such, it determined that the statute could not be
considered an incidental burden and therefore it must be a direct
burden.
To the contrary, the Court designed the O'Brien test to deal
with cases in which a regulation negatively impacts expression.
Johnson cannot be read to have changed the O'Brien test to one
including only regulations unconnected to expression. Such a
reading would leave O'Brien without meaning since "every civil
and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First
Amendment protected activities." 8 The Second Circuit's reading
84 Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 781 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407).
85 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377) (emphasis added).
86 Id.
87 Simon &" Schuster, 916 F.2d at 781.
88 Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 30 (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
'478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986)).
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of Texas v. Johnson would render obsolete the entire O'Brien test.
Any conduct that has a combined communicative and non-com-
municative aspect would fail this expansive reading of O'Brien.
To confirm the conclusion that the Son of Sam law directly
burdened speech, the Second Circuit also drew upon the Su-
preme Court's holding in Meyer v. Grant.9 Referring to Meyer,
the Second Circuit concluded that the Court had held "that the
denial of payment for expressive activity constitutes a direct bur-
den on that activity."90 However, Meyer must be read in light of
its facts. Meyer did not make such a broad holding, and it is un-
likely that the Supreme Court intended Meyer to be interpreted in
such a way.
In Meyer, the Court found that a Colorado statute that pro-
hibited paying solicitors to circulate initiative petitions impeded
the sponsors' opportunity to disseminate their views to the public.
The appellees in Meyer were the members of a political group
who wanted to pay solicitors to circulate an initiative that the
appellees sponsored. The Court found that the statute prohibiting
the appellees from paying the solicitors burdened the appellee's
speech in two ways. First, "it limits the number of voices who will
convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, there-
fore limits the size of the audience they can reach" and second,
"it makes it less likely that the appellees will garner the number
of signatures necessary . . . thus limiting their ability to make the
matter the focus of statewide discussion."91 The Court classified
this as a direct restriction on expression that was subject to the
strict scrutiny standard."
The Second Circuit interpreted the burden caused by disal-
lowing the speakers to pay solicitors, to stand for the broad prop-
osition that any denial of payment for expressive activity directly
burdens that activity. But to apply Meyer to the criminal's or the
publisher's first amendment claims, that party must be in the
same position as the political group. Juxtaposing the publisher
into the position of the political group shows that Meyer is inap-
plicable. .In Meyer, as well as in the other cases that the appellee
89 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
90 Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 781 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422-24).
91 Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 420. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). In Buchkley, the Court
held that campaign expenditure limitations were direct restrictions on expressive conduct.
The Court struck down the statute's expenditure ceilings after finding that the statute
was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Id. at 45.
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cites, a regulation restricted the spending that the speakers de-
pended on in order to get out their messages. The publisher
must be attempting to pay someone to project the publisher's
message. The problem is that Simon & Schuster has no message
to convey, which is entirely different from Meyer.9" Simon &
Schuster is free to pay others to convey any of its own messages.
Likewise, the criminal cannot be regarded as being in the same
predicament as the appellees in Meyer. In Meyer, the speakers'
ability to speak was dependent upon their paying the solicitors.
The regulation forbade the speakers from paying others to ampli-
fy their message. In contrast, Henry Hill is free to pay others to
convey his message and in fact, has a more than willing party to
act as a conduit. The Court in Meyer was concerned with the
appellees' ability to amplify their message rather than preserving a
source of income for the solicitors.
94
Differentiating Meyer does not necessarily prove that Son of
Sam laws do not directly burden a criminal's speech. Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit never conducted a thorough analysis of this
issue, since it relied entirely, on an analogy to Meyer to find a
direct burden.
2. Content-Based Discrimination.
The Second Circuit's decision is also flawed because it failed
to apply the proper test to determine if the statute is content-
based or content-neutral. The Second Circuit assumed that a regu-
lation that effects only one type of content, such as a criminal's
story, is a content-based restriction, subject to strict scrutiny. First
93 The district court differentiated Meyer by finding that the statute in Meyer affect-
ed political speech, whereas the Son of Sam law does not effect political speech. Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). The Second Circiit correctly rejected the distinction based 6n political
advocacy noting that "[p]rotected expression comes in many forms other than ideological
or political speech." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir.
1990). Nonetheless, Meyer is better differentiated by considering the position of the
speaker.
94 Meyer and the rest of these cases are concerned with speakers being unable to
amplify their messages. Cf Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) ("[A]llowing the presentation of views while
forbidding the expenditure of more than,$1,000 to present them is much like allowing a
speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying
system."). But the Son of Sam law does not deny the publisher the use of the amplify-
ing system, rather the publisher is standing in front of the microphone with nothing to
say.
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amendment law does not dictate such a result.95 Recent cases re-
quire courts to look at the justification of the statute to deter-
mine if it is content-based or content-neutral." The court con-
cluded that the statute is content-based without considering the
underlying justifications of the Son of Sam law.
3. Strict Scrutiny Standard
The Second Circuit concluded that the Son of Sam law sur-
vived strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court is unlikely to do the
same. It will almost certainly find that the Son of Sam law does
not further a compelling state interest, since when considering if
a statute passes the compelling test, the Court considers the quan-
tity of chilled speech. If the regulation chills too much speech,
the government's interest is rarely considered compelling.
9 7 Si-
mon & Schuster persuasively demonstrate that many stories will
not be written if the criminal does not receive immediate com-
pensation." This chilling effect will likely cause the Court to
strike down the New York Son of Sam law.
B. The Proper Analysis: Whose First Amendment Interests?
To determine whether the Son of Sam law should be subject
to the O'Brien balancing test or stricter scrutiny, the analysis
should focus on whether the law can meet the prerequisites of
O'Brien. To achieve a more organized analysis, the Court should
first identify whose first amendment interests are at stake. 99 Si-
95 See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
98 The appellant has compiled an impressive list of books that allegedly would not
have been written if this statute had been in effect at the time. The list serves the dual
purpose of demonstrating that the statute effects speech and of discouraging the Court
from finding a compelling state interest. The books include: E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE
(1967); J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976); J. EHRLIcHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER (1982); J.
GENET, A THIEF'S JOURNAL (1964); A. HISS, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFE (1988); M. L.
KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? (1967); N. MAILER, THE ARMIES OF THE
NIGHT (1968); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1973); H. THOREAU,
ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1966), Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 11-12.
99 The Court should consider the framework separately for each individual who
claims that his or her first amendment right to free expression has been violated. In
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) the Court followed a similar approach. The Court
first considered the political contributors' right to free speech, then the political
advocates' right to free speech. But see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 775-76 (1978). In Bellotti, the Court recognized first amendment rights broader than
those of the parties before it:
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mon & Schuster argues that New York's Son of Sam law impli-
cates the rights of three parties-the criminal, the publisher and
the public. The next sections discuss the claims of each party
separately.
1. The Criminal: The Right to Speak
The criminal's first amendment right at stake is the right to
disseminate his or her ideas. Henry Hill claims that denying pay-
ment for his speech interferes with his right of free expression.
The following section demonstrates that a criminal's first amend-
ment claim should, at most, be considered an incidental burden
subject to the O'Brien test.
The threshold test for any first amendment claim is whether
the regulation restricts expressive activity.100" The New York
Crime Victims Board argued that the Son of Sam law does not
restrict expressive activity.' 01 First, the statute does not prohibit
speech since criminals remain entirely free to communicate their
messages. Second, the statute does not deny the speaker the
means to communicate, since publishers remain free to dissemi-
nate any story a willing criminal agrees to provide them. Third,
"[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker," °2 and the
Court has never recognized a constitutional right to be paid for
speaking.' Both the district court and the Second Circuit re-
jected the above argument, recognizing that it is possible that
fewer criminals will tell their stories to the media when this law
in force. Simon & Schuster persuasively argued before the Second
Circuit that the effect of the Son of Sam statute on criminals'
speech is strong.10 4 Once the Court determines that the law
The court below framed the principal question in this case as whether and to
what extent corporations have First Amendment rights. We believe that the
court posed the wrong question. The Constitution often protects interests broad-
er than those of the party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in
particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper question . . . must be
whether [the law] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect.
Id
100 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) ("We must first determine whether
Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct.").
101 Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 24-26.
102 Virginia Pharmacy Rd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976).
103 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1107-08 (10th ed. 1980).
104 See suprm note 98.
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chills speech, it must continue its inquiry to determine the type
of burden and the appropriate type of scrutiny. The Court will
have another opportunity to consider the extent of the chilling
effect when it conducts the appropriate balancing test.
After determining that the statute chills speech, the Court
must resolve whether the speech involved is subject to first
amendment protection. All speech is protected unless it fits into
one of the categories mentioned earlier. °5 The district court
analyzed the possible classification of the criminal's speech as less
protected commercial speech.05 The Supreme Court has clearly
stated that literary works, even those undertaken for the sole pur-
pose of profiting are not commercial speech.0 7  Since the
criminal's speech does not fit into any unprotected or less pro-
tected category, it is entitled to full first amendment protection.
The Board argues that the Son of Sam law regulates Hill's
contract, not his speech, and that any burden on his speech is
incidental to the law and the O'Brien test controls. As explained
above, a regulation must be content neutral, aimed at something
other than suppressing speech, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication to come under O'Brien's'less demand-
ing rule.'
08
Simon & Schuster argues that since the statute applies only
to criminals and only to stories about their crimes, the statute is
content-based. 0 9 Simply because one type of speech is affected
and another type is not, does not control the label assigned to
the regulation."0 Instead, the Court must focus on whether the
statute can be justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech."' The Son of Sam law can be justified with-
105 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
106 Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F.
Supp. 170, 175 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
107 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
108 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
109 Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 35-41. The Second Circuit agreed with this
argument. Simon & Schuster v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1990).
110 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("A regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."); see also Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
111 Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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out reference to the content of the regulated speech. The law
attempts to prevent criminals from spending the profits from
their speech until they compensate their victims for the harm that
the criminals caused them. The regulation does not govern
criminals' speech because the content is considered undesirable or
bad. 12  Additionally, the statute applies regardless of the
criminal's perspective on the crime. The criminal could gloat or
show remorse, the statute will control in either case. Viewpoint
neutrality is also vital to the claim that a statue is content-neu-
tral. 1 3
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,"4 the Court upheld a
zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters
from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, church,
park or school. The Court explained that the ordinance was not
aimed at the content of the films shown, even though "the ordi-
nance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from
other kinds of theaters.""' Rather, the statute was aimed at the
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding communi-
ty."' The Court found that the city's pursuit of its zoning inter-
ests was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Similarly,
the Son of Sam law is aimed at the secondary effect of the
criminal's speech, the criminal's profit.
Next, the Court will consider the government's interest in the
Son of Sam law. If the interest is aimed at suppressing the
criminal's speech, then the law will be subject to strict scruti-
ny."7 The Son of Sam law must not be aimed at suppressing
the criminal's speech to be subject to the lower standard of re-
view that O'Brien sets out.
To determine the aim of the statute, the Court should first
identify the conduct that the Son of Sam law regulates. The stat-
ute restricts payments to criminals for reenacting their "thoughts,
feelings, opinions, or emotions.""1 The criminal is not restricted
from speaking," 9 rather the criminal is prohibited from immedi-
112 This is the central inquiry. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) ("The government's purpose is the controlling consideration.").
113 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
114 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
115 Id. at 47-48.
116 Id.
117 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989).
118 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
119 N.Y. EXEc. LAW §632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991), construed in Children of
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ately realizing the profit from contracting to reenact his or her
crime. 120 Contracting to speak about the crime is the regulated
conduct. This conduct includes both communicative and non-com-
municative elements. The contracting is the non-communicative
element and the speaking is the communicative element. The stat-
ute aims to regulate the impact of the contract, the non-communi-
cative element.
Simon & Schuster argues that the Son of Sam law regulates
communicative conduct, because the speech is dependent upon
paying criminals, since the criminals will not speak unless they are
paid to speak. 121 The publisher relies on Buckley v. Valeo, in
which the Court stated that when speech is dependent upon mon-
ey, money is a communicative element of conduct.
122
In Buckley, the Court recognized that communicative conduct
often requires speakers to spend money in order amplify their
messages: "This is because virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of mon-
ey."123 The Court emphasized that the expenditure of money by
the speaker to amplify his or her message is a communicative
element stating: "[T]his Court has never suggested that the depen-
dence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates
itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting
scrutiny required by the First Amendment."1 24 Therefore, if the
Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 1004, 541 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898 (Sup. Ct.
1989) ("Most significantly, the statute does not prohibit a person convicted or accused of
a crime from engaging in conduct designed to communicate the details of the crime or
his thoughts and feelings about its commission or about the resulting prosecution and
trial.").
120 A New York Superior Court noted: "The statute affects only the rights of the
perpetrator to receive any profit from communications concerning the crime unless and
until all proceeds have been held in escrow for five years and made available to satisfy
any civil judgment obtained against the wrongdoer." N.Y. EXEC. LAW §632-a(1)
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991), construed in Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d at 1004-05,
541 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
121 Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 29-30.
122 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
123 Id. at 19. The Court has applied Buckley's view of money as a communicative ele-
ment numerous times since 1975. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 (1988) ("[T]he
prohibition against the use of paid circulators has the inevitable effect of reducing the
total quantum of speech."); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 493 (1985); Secretary of State v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984)
("[S]olicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are entitled to the protections
of the First Amendment.").
124 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. But see FEC, 470 U.S. at 508 (White, J., dissenting) ("The
First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend, and limitations on
the amount of money that can be spent are not the same as restrictions on speak-
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speaker's ability to communicate his or her ideas is dependent on
the expenditure of money, the expenditure of money is a commu-
nicative element.15 Since the money is a communicative ele-
ment, laws that regulate the speaker's expenditure of money can-
not claim to regulate a non-communicative element.
Even though criminals may be less likely to speak if they are
not paid for their efforts, this fact does not lead to the conclu-
sion that criminals' speech is dependent upon their ability to con-
tract for the speech. In Buckley, as well as the other cases which
considered speech dependent on money,"2 6 the speakers were
attempting to pay money in order to vocalize their messages. The
Court feared that the speakers could not amplify their messages
without spending money. To the contrary, the Son of Sam legisla-
tion does not hinder the criminals from amplifying their messag-
es. The statute also does not prohibit them from paying someone
to publish or tell their stories. If the criminal is willing to speak,
the publisher is more than willing to amplify the message. The
criminals' ability to tell their stories is not dependent on the con-
tracting for a payment since the criminals do not need to pay any
money in order to tell their stories.
The publisher also asserts that the speech is dependent on
the payment because without the payment criminals will not be
financially able to dedicate their time to telling their- story. The
Court has rejected this theory of dependency. The Court has
stated that the liberty interest "does not confer an entitlement to
such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of
that freedom."
127
Since criminals' speech is not dependent on the ability to
contract, the Court should classify the contract as non-communica-
tive conduct. Simply because the Son of Sam law regulates the
contracting, which can be labeled as non-communicative conduct,
it does not necessarily mean that the government's interest is not
ing ... .The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations on the spending of mon-
ey is minimal and indirect."); Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69
A.B.A.J. 1078 (1983) (criticizing Buckley); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the
First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982) (criticiz-
ing Buckley); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976) (criticizing Buckley).
125 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
126 See supra note 123.
127 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980). See also Regan v. Taxation With Rep-
resentation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983).
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aimed at suppression. The government might regulate non-com-
municative conduct in order to indirectly suppress speech.
128
The Court must look at the government's purpose for the regula-
tion.
Simon & Schuster does not contest that the governmental
interest underlying the Son of Sam law is "assuring that a crimi-
nal not profit from the exploitation of his or her crime while the
victims of that crime are in need of compensation by reason of
their victimization."129 In addition, the legislative intent, °30 the
actual statute and the practical application of the Son of Sam law
all indicate that the government has not aimed at suppressing ex-
pression.13 1 The regulation never forbids the criminal from
speaking. The Son of Sam law merely makes it less profitable for
the criminal to speak. The government is not, trying to stop the
speech, just the proceeds of the speech. If the government were
really interested in suppressing the criminal's message, it would
remove the profit incentive from the publisher. This type of regu-
lation would truly disable the criminal's message and would be
more analogous to Meyer v. Grant.3 2 Instead, New York's Son of
Sam law leaves the profits of the publisher and the professional
writer untouched. 33
The final condition that the Son of Sam law must meet be-
fore the Court will employ the lesser standard of review is that it
leaves ample alternative channels of communication open. Strictly
speaking, this requirement does not pose a problem. The criminal
is not restricted from speaking and the media is not restricted
from publishing. In fact, if a criminal is willing to speak to the
press for free, the publisher will be even happier to amplify the
128 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm. of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983).
129 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1990).
130 See supra note 12. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
131 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989) (The state's interest in pre-
serving the flag as a symbol of national unity was aimed at suppressing expression.);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1975) (The Court found that the governmental interest
underlying the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was to suppress communication,
since the act tried to equalize the ability to effect the outcome of elections by placing a
ceiling on communicative expenditures.); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974)
("We are confronted then with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea.");
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (A statute is aimed at supressing expression if it "punish[es]
people who express[] their 'opposition to organized government'" (citing Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)).
132 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
133 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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criminal's message. Criminals do not need to find alternative
means to express themselves.
If the Court is concerned about the possibility that the
criminal's story will-not find its way into the marketplace of ideas
because the statute destroys the criminal's profit motive, instead
of asking "Can the criminal speak?" the Court might ask "Will the
criminal still speak?" Simon & Schuster is sure they will not. How-
ever, the Court should consider that criminals may have motiva-
tions for speaking besides the profit motive. Evidence exists that
some criminals are willing to share their stories without immedi-
ate compensation.'TM Criminals may be motivated to speak by a
desire to publicize their side of the story,13 5 or even to gain no-
toriety among friends and neighbors."3 6 Additionally, accused in-
dividuals may use the proceeds from a media contract to fund
their own defense."3 7 Since the Son of Sam law meets all of the
preliminary requirements, the Court should scrutinize the law
using the O'Brien standard.'
O'Brien requires the Son of Sam law to, further an important
or substantial governmental interest and be no greater than essen-
tial to further that interest. 139 As stated earlier, this standard is
lax; the O'Brien test is met if the governmental interest "would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."'40  Simon &
Schuster argues that New York already has a number of remedies
available for victims to satisfy tort judgments. 4' Nonetheless,
134 According to John H. Stein, the deputy'director of the National Organization for
Victims Assistance in Washington, D.C., "'Accomplished writers spending a year or two
or three on a single book, like Peter Maas or Gay Talese, have proven to the world that
you don't have to pay these scumbags--they'll tell you anyway, if you're a hardworking,
honest journalist.'" Snider, Coming Soon to A Theater Near You, 7 CAL. LAW. 28, 31-32
(1987).
135 Note, Criminal Antiprofit Law, supra note 32, at 1365.
136 Henry Hill, living under the assumed name of Martin Lewis, appeared in disguise
on the ABC television news program "20/20" to discuss his lengthy career in organized
crime. Risking his new identity and security, he is reported to have urged his neighbors
to watch the program. The neighbors apparently recognized Lewis as Hill despite the
disguise because Lewis had bragged for years that he was Hill of Wiseguy fame. Brief for
Appellee, supra note 19, at 17 n.10.
137 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 6 32-a(8) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
138 At this point it does not matter if the Court classifies the restriction as an inci-
dental burden or a time, place or manner restriction because the scrutiny in O'Brien
controls in either case. See supra note 50 and accoinpanying text.
139 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
140 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). See supra note 54 and ac-
companying text.
141 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 5000-5252 (Consol. 1990).
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the regular provisions allowing for garnishment of wages are inef-
fective in a situation where someone receives one large lump-sum
payment for a one-time job. The Son of Sam law recognizes this
problem and the problem that once the money is paid to the
criminal, the criminal can evade the reach of New York's attach-
ment provisions. For these reasons, New York's interest in com-
pensating crime victims would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation.1 2 Recognizing this, the district court upheld the
law and the Supreme Court should as well."'
2. The Publisher
In addition to the first amendment claims that pertain to the
criminal's right to speak, Simon & Schuster raises its own first
amendment claims."' Simon & Schuster argues that the Son of
Sam law infringes on its freedom of speech and freedom of the
142 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
143 The suggested result in this case is not meant as a proposal that all statutes re-
stricting payment to speakers are constitutional. Situations may arise when a regulation
that limits payments to speakers is aimed at suppressing the speech. A hypothetical ex-
ample. of this type of regulation would be the government forbidding educational groups
from paying speakers to make presentations on topics that the government did not want
speakers to discuss. This kind of regulation would surely be subject to strict scrutiny
because of the regulation's aim to suppress speech. Even some statutes that are not
aimed at suppressing speech and are appropriately considered under the O'Brien test
may not survive even this lesser scrutiny. A possible example of this type of regulation is
the new federal ethics regulation forbidding all federal employees from receiving pay-
ment for speeches, articles, or appearances regardless of the topic. See Crane, Arrest Me,
Officer, I'm Writing!, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1991, at C6, col. 1. This regulation prohibits
even low level employees from collecting money for speaking about a subject totally
unrelated to their employment, such as gardening. The aim of this regulation is to pre-
vent excessive honoraria to high level officials. This regulation would likely fail even
under the O'Brien standard since it is far stronger than that which would be essential to
further this goal.
144 Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 18. The publisher asserts the first amend-
ment rights of the criminal, writers, and the public at large. Id. at 22 n.12. The appellee
argues that Simon & Schuster lacks standing to assert the interests of third parties not
before the Court. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 25 n.13. Clearly, a case or con-
troversy is present, since the Board has ordered Simon & Schuster to pay the Board
$96,250 and to turn over any future royalties. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 10-
11. The standing issue rests on prudential principles. Secretary of State v. J.H. Munson
Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), indicates that the Court will allow Simon & Schuster to assert
the claims of third parties. In Munson, the Court recognized that "[w]ithin the context of
the First Amendment, the Court has enumerated other concerns that justify a lessening
of prudential limitations on standing." Id. at 956. The Court faced with an issue of
standing similar to that in Simon & Schuster, held that the prudential limitations on
standing did not stop a fundraising organization from asserting the first amendment
claims of potential clients. Id. at 959.
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press since the law restricts the 'publisher from "making timely,
and certain payments for speech."145 The publisher asserts that
this inability to make payments to the criminal also implicates the
publisher's right to receive information. Finally, Simon & Schuster
claims that the statute violates the first amendment by singling
out the press.1
46
(a) Simon & Schuster's Right to Speak.-Section 632-a does not
prohibit Simon & Schuster directly or indirectly from speak-
ing.147 Rather, the Son of Sam law controls the publisher's
method of payment to criminals who sell it their stories. The
statute conceivably limits the material available for the publisher
to print since criminals might not discuss their wrongdoings
without an immediate financial incentive. 14' Nevertheless, this is
a burden on Simon & Schuster's ability to collect information, not
a burden on Simon & Schuster's ability to disseminate the
information that it possesses, including information obtained from
a criminal.
The publisher has no message to convey until the criminals
relate their affairs to it. Simon & Schuster successfully drew the
court's attention away from its lack of ideas to express by adopt-
ing the criminal's message as its own. The publisher analogizes
the Son of Sam law's restriction on payment of money to crimi-
nals to the restriction the Supreme Court struck down in Meyer v
Grant. But in Meyer the speaker had something to say.149 In this
case, Simon & Schuster has nothing to say. Instead, the publisher
is collecting information. The publisher is trying to pay someone
to bring an idea back to it, it is not trying to amplify its own idea
as was the case in Meyer. The direction of the flow of information
distinguishes this case from Meyer.5 ' The Court should consider
only the criminals' rights to tell their story--when it considers
145 Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 24.
146 Id at 31.
147 N.Y. EXEC. LAW. § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991); cf, Children of Bed-
ford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 1004, 541 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898-99 (Sup. Ct.
1989).
148 "[IUt is often more difficult to get .people to work without compensation than it
is to get them to work for pay." Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 25 (citing Meyer
v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 (1988)).
149 In Meyer, the speaker wished to discuss a proposed "amendment to the Colorado
Constitution -that would remove motor carriers from the jurisdiction of the Colorado
Public Utilities Commission." Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 (1988).
150 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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whether the Son of Sam law burdens the right to speak. 5'
(b) Simon & Schuster's Right to Access.-Simon & Schuster has
also asserted a right to acquire information as a member of the
press. On its face, the first amendment explicitly prohibits the
government from abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press.152  The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed
whether the press clause provides the media with first amendment
guarantees in addition to the protection granted ordinary
members of the public.1 53 The Court has never held that the
press clause does not provide additional first amendment
protection to the press, but it has also never granted it an
independent constitutional scope.1
54
While the Court has not clarified whether or not the press is
generally entitled to first amendment protection in addition to
that provided to the public, it has held that the press has no right
of access greater than that of the general public.'55 The Court
has only recognized a right of access, for both the public and the
151 Cf Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, the group Rock
Against Racism argued that a New York law that required musicians performing in Cen-
tral Park to use the sound technicians and sound system that the city provided was un-
constitutional. The Court considered the first amendment rights of the musicians, not
recognizing any separate speech right in the amplifier.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1977) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring). See generally Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731
(1977); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REv. 77 (1975); Lewis, A Pre-
ferred Position For Journalism?, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 595 (1979); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Free-
dom of the Press A Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS LJ.
639 (1975); Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS. LJ. 631 (1975) (excerpted from an
address on November 2, 1974, at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation,
New Haven, Connecticut).
154 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 798 n.3 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 834 (1974) (suggesting the press clause lacks independent scope). But see Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (assuming the Press Clause provides additional first
amendment protection).
155 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (the Constitution does not provide
the press any greater protection than the general public); Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) ("The First Amendment generally grants the press
no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public."); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) ("The Constitution does not, however, require gov-
ernment to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally."); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 857 (1974); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) ("[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally."). C.f Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (both
the public and the press are entitled to the same right of access to criminal trials).
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press, in the limited area of government controlled information.
The Son of Sam law does not apply to government controlled
information and, as such, the public and the press do not have a
.constitutionally protected right to acquire Henry Hill's story.
The Constitution also does not forbid government regulations
from making it more difficult for the press to acquire informa-
tion. For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes,156 the Court ac-
knowledged that requiring reporters to reveal confidential sources
deterred the sources from speaking and made it more difficult for
the reporters to write their stories. 5 7 Nonetheless, the Court
found that requiring reporters to name their sources "involve[s]
no intrusion upon speech . ... or restriction on what the press
may publish," even though it burdens reporters' ability to gather
information from sources. 5 Similarly, the Son of Sam law does
not intrude on the publisher's first amendment rights even
though it makes it more difficult for the publisher to acquire the
story because the criminal's payment must be placed in an escrow
account.
(c) Singling Out The Press.-In addition to arguing that it has
a right to acquire Henry Hill's story, Simon & Schuster asserts
another first amendment claim based on its status as a member
of the press. Simon & Schuster claims that the Son of Sam law is
unconstitutional because it singles out the press. This argument is
based on the fact that the Son of Sam law applies only to the
criminal's contracts that are for the reenactment of his or her
crime.
159
The Court first recognized regulations that singled out the
press as unconstitutional in Minneapolis Star &. Tribune Co. v. Min-
nesota Commissioner of Revenue. 6 ° In that case, the Court held
that a special tax on the press violated the first amendment be-
cause it singled out the press 6' Simon & Schuster argues that
the Son of Sam law singles out the press in the way Minneapolis
Star forbade and is unconstitutional.' But the text of the Son
156 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
157 Id. at 679-80.
158 I at 681.
159 Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 32.
160 460 U.S. 575 (1983). See also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987).
161 Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592-93.
162 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not yet applied Minneapolis Star's holding in
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of Sam law requires any legal entity, which contracts with crimi-
nals to reenact their crimes, to place the criminals' payments into
escrow accounts. 6 The statutory language does not apply solely
to the press.
164
Simon & Schuster relies on Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.165 to
extend the rule in Minneapolis Star166 to all regulations that "im-
pose a disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected
first amendment activities."' 67 In Arcara, the Erie County district
attorney filed a civil complaint against the Village Books and
News Store, seeking closure of the adult book store for violating
the New York public health nuisance law.16  Village Books ar-
gued that closing its book store violated the first amendment be-
cause it was engaged in protected bookselling activities.1 69 The
Supreme Court held that a public health regulation of general
application did not implicate the first amendment. 70 The Court
reached this conclusion after noting that every criminal and civil
statute that has some effect on a first amendment activity does
not trigger constitutional scrutiny. 17' To provide contrast, the
Court cited O'Brien and Minneapolis Star to show when a govern-
ment regulation did implicate the first amendment. 7 2 O'Brien
protects conduct containing a significant expressive element, such
as O'Brien's burning of his draft card.173 Minneapolis Star grants
first amendment protection even to conduct that does not contain
areas other than taxation. The Court in Minneapolis Star stated that "[a] tax that singles
out the press, or that targets individual publications within the press, places a heavy
burden on the State to justify its action." Id. at 592. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 227 ("Our
cases clearly establish that a discriminatory tax on the press burdens rights protected by
the First Amendment") But cf Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (the
Court considered Minneapolis Star when reviewing a nuisance statute); Legi-Tech, Inc. v.
Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 734 (2d Cir. 1985) ("We do not think that the rationale of Minne-
apolis Star is limited to taxation"); Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800
F.2d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The rationale of Minneapolis Star may require its exten-
sion beyond taxation to regulations that impose differential penalties directly on some
First Amendment activity.").
163 N.Y. ExEc. LAW §632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
164 Id.
165 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
166 460 U.S. 575 (1983). See also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987).
167 Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704-07.
168 Id. at 698-99.
169 Id. at 700.
170 Id. at 707.
171 Id. at 706.
172 Id. at 704-05.
173 United States v. O'Brien, 391 US. 367, 376-77 (1968).
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an expressive component if the regulation singles out the
press."74 The Court refused to fit Arcara into either of these
categories. Simon & Schuster argues that the Son of Sam law
does implicate the first amendment following Minneapolis Star.
Simon & Schuster quotes Arcara's explanation of Minneapolis
Star. that a statute that "impose[s] a disproportionate burden
upon those engaged in protected First Amendment activities"
17 5
violates the first amendment unless the government can show a
compelling interest.17 1 Simon & Schuster uses Arcara's language
and differentiates its outcome. The nuisance law in Arcara applied
to the general public, not just to those engaged in expressive activi-
ties.177 In contrast, the Son of Sam law applies mainly to those
who engage in expressive activities, such as publishers, writers and
film makers.
Even though the Son of Sam law applies mainly to those
engaged in expressive conduct, the law is not aimed at suppress-
ing that conduct. *17  In Minneapolis Star, after the Court deter-
mined that the tax singled out the press, it continued its analysis
of the tax stating that the differential treatment suggested that the
regulation was aimed at suppression of expression.179 Minneapo-
lis Star does not answer the question of whether or not a statute
-which singles out the press is subject to strict scrutiny without an
inquiry into whether the statute is aimed at suppressing expres-
sion. Other courts have considered the Court's conclusion in Min-
neapolis Star* that the tax was aimed at suppressing speech central
to its holding."8 Interpreting Arcara as Simon & Schuster sug-
gests would annul statutes without considering whether the gov-
174 Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1982).
175 Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 705.
178 See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
179 The Court stated, "[flurther, differential treatment, unless justified by some spe-
cial characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated
to suppression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional." Minne-
apolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
180 See, e.g., Associated Film Distr. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369, 374 (3d Cir.
1986) ("An essential factor in the Minneapolis Star analysis is the inference of a goal to
suppress expression"); Legi-Tech v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (After
the court concluded that Minneapolis Star should not be limited to taxation, it found
that a statute that infringes on equal access to the media "would surely face a most
hostile scrutiny under the First Amendment. We say that because we believe it fairly
obvious that the only purpose of such regulation would be to limit the dissemination of
speech protected by the First Amendment.").
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ernment is aiming to suppress speech. The controlling consider-
ation should be whether or not the regulation is aimed at sup-
pressing expression."'
Simon & Schuster's claim that the. Son of Sam law requires
strict scrutiny because the statute singles out the press is un-
sound. First, the actual language does not single out the press.
Second, even assuming that the Court agrees that the Son of Sam
law inflicts a disproportionate burden on the press, the publisher
must convince the Court to ignore that the underlying goal of
singling out the press in Minneapolis Star was to suppress expres-
sion.
3. The Public at Large: The Right to Receive?
Simon & Schuster asserts a right to receive information as a
member of the public as well as the general public's right to re-
ceive information.'82 The publisher seems to claim that because
the statute potentially lessens the quantum of speech available to
the public, the statute violates the public's right to receive infor-
mation.
The right to receive information emerged in dicta in a variety
of cases. 8 3 These cases involved both protected and unprotect-
ed speech and speakers, and they suggest that the right to receive
information exists independently of the speaker's right to
speak."8 Nonetheless, commentators have dismissed this dicta's
validity in cases where a private source is unwilling to voluntarily
divulge the information.'85
Even assuming, however unlikely, that the Court does recog-
nize a right to receive information, the Court will probably not
181 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
182 Since the public's right to receive information, if it exists, will be identical to the
publisher's right as a member of the public, this analysis will use "public" to include
both the public at large and Simon & Schuster as a member of the public.
183 See O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know" 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 579, 625 n.244 (1980) (listing the following cases recognizing a right to re-
ceive: Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(commercial speech); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (personal correspon-
dence of prisoners); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (possession of obsceni-
ty); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 482-83 (1965) (contraceptive information);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (political information); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (religious materials); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143, 149 (1943) (religious literature)).
184 Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1505, 1505-06 (1974).
185 See O'Brien, supra note 183, at 618-20; Note, supra note 184, at 1506.
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provide any greater protection to individuals asserting the right to
receive than it provides to 'individuals with a right to speak. To
analyze this possible first amendment claim, the Court might ap-
ply the O'Brien analysis explained in Part III of this Comment,
substituting the right to speak with the right to receive informa-
tion. Already finding that the law -is content-neutral,1 8 6 the
Court would focus on the aim of the Son of Sam law. If the
Court determines that the Son of Sam law is aimed at suppress-
ing the public's receipt of information, the Court would conclude
that the statute is unconstitutional. Nontheless, a statute enacted
for a chilling purpose is very different from one that has no aim
to suppress. but simply has a chilling effect. The Son of Sam stat-
ute falls into the latter category. The statute does not forbid the
publisher from offering compensation to criminals, rather it con-
trols how criminals dispose of their profits. This statute is aimed
at compensating the victims by targeting the non-communicative
conduct of how criminals spend their profit, not at chilling
speech. Once the Court determines that the aim of the statute is
not to withhold information from the public, the final prerequi-
site for the O'Brien test is that the law leaves open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication. As discussed previously, the crim-
inal may be enticed to speak without immediate compensation for
a variety of reaisons.
187
Ignoring' this analysis and allowing the public to assert a di-
rect burden on their first amendment freedoms, subject, to strict
scrutiny, whenever speech is chilled, regardless of the
government's interests in the regulation, disregards first amend-
ment jurisprudence in which the Court allows some speech to be
incidentally curtailed by laws seeking to advance other objectives.
The public's loss of information does not go unnoticed by the
Court even when the Court is focusing on the speaker's right to
speak. To determine if the burden on a speaker's right to free-
dom of expression 'is constitutional, the Court considers the
public's loss of information. The tests for both direct and inciden-
tal burdens involve a balancing that pits the loss of the speech
available to the public against the government's interest. The
public's "right to receive" information should not independently
invalidate the statute.
186 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
187 See supra, notes 134-37 and accompanying text. -
1075]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
First amendment protection of free expression is a complex
and confusing area of constitutional law. The lack of an overall
framework for analyzing free expression challenges caused the
Second Circuit to incorrectly decide Simon & Schuster. The unique
facts of Simon & Schuster make this case difficult to fit into any
category of cases the Supreme Court has previous decided. Analy-
sis of the O'Brien test in Part III and the underlying principles of
the prior cases is helpful in sorting out whether the statute is a
direct or incidental burden on the first amendment rights of the
criminal, the publisher and the public. This Comment suggests
that the same principles apply to all first amendment claims.
When the Supreme Court hears Simon & Schuster's appeal in
the October 1991 session it will have the opportunity to clarify its
recent first amendment decisions regarding the relationship be-
tween money and speech, direct and incidental burdens, and con-
tent-based or content-neutral regulations. In light of the Court's
recent decisions, this Comment concludes that the Son of Sam
law should be treated as a content-neutral, incidental burden on
speech, that is subject to mid-level scrutiny. As such, the Court
should uphold the Son of Sam statute.
Karen M. Ecker
Margot J. O'Brien
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